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vagrancy statutes on vagueness grounds. 72 The Oregon court opinion,73
which the Florida court discounted, appears to be the more cautiously reasoned opinion. To salvage the loitering statute, the Florida court applied the
reasonable man standard and added the requirement that each distinct element of the act be satisfied. This may mitigate the constitutional objections
to the statute; however, it is still questionable whether the notice requirement
of the fourteenth amendment has been met. Although worded differently, the
new statute may have the same effect as the invalidated Florida statute74 allowing arbitrary arrest. Although society has a strong and justifiable interest in effective law enforcement, "[t]he vagrancy laws were never intended
to be and may not be used as an administrative short cut to avoid the requirements of due process in the administration of criminal justice."75
BETSY

J.

ELLWANGER

ESTATE TAX - THE UNCERTAIN APPLICATION OF SECTION 2036
William duPont, Jr., 63 T.C. 746 (1975)
On December 31, 1965, William duPont, Jr., died testate, leaving an
estate valued in excess of 100 million dollars. Four years prior to his death,
decedent had conveyed 242! acres surrounding his personal residence to Hall,
Inc., a corporation created exclusively for the purpose of holding that property. In exchange for the property, decedent received 100 percent of the
corporation's stock. The fair market value of the property was $1,680,700.
Shortly thereafter, decedent leased the land back for a ten-year term with
an option to renew for successive ten-year periods. The rental charge was
substantially less than the fair rental value of the property. Decedent then
transferred all the stock to an inter vivos irrevocable trust in which he retained
no interest. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue determined an estate
tax deficiency based on the inclusion of the value of this property in decedent's gross estate pursuant to section 2036(a) of the Internal Revenue
Code.1 Decedent's estate petitioned for a redetermination of the deficiency,
72.
73.
74.
311 So.
75.
(1967).

See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
Portland v. White, 9 Ore. App. 239, 495 P.2d 778 (1972).
This echoes the substance of Justice Ervin's brief dissent in the instant case. See
2d at 111-12.
Fenster v. Leary, 20 N.Y.2d 309, 316, 229 N.E.2d 426, 430, 282 N.Y.S.2d 739, 745

1. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §2036 states: "(a) GENERAL RULE. -The
value of gross
estate shall include the value of all property to the extent of any interest therein of which
the decedent has at any time made a transfer (except in case of a bona fide sale for an
adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth), by trust or otherwise, under
which he has retained for his life or for any period not ascertainable without reference
to his death or for any period which does not in fact end before his death -(1)
the
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and the Tax Court HELD, in substance decedent had actually retained "the
possession or enjoyment of" the property for a period that did not in fact
end before his death, therefore its value was properly included in his gross
2
estate.
Historically, section 2036 and its statutory antecedents have reflected a
legislative policy of taxing transfers that are "essentially testamentary" in
nature.3 The Purpose of this section is to frustrate what would otherwise be
an effective device for the avoidance of estate tax. 4 In the absence of section
2036, a person could gratuitously transfer property, retain the right to enjoy
it through a life estate, and yet escape the burden of estate tax liability on
death. Accordingly, section 2036 is designed to include transfers that leave
the transferor a significant interest in, or control over, the property transferred.5 A classic comment concerning the type of conveyance that will effectively escape taxation under this section is that of Justice Black in Commissioner v. Estate of Church:

possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the income from the property, or (2) the right,
either alone or in conjunction with any person, to designate the person wyho shall possess
or enjoy the property or the income therefrom." There is a distinction between the type
of reserved interests covered by the two subsections of this statute. Under §2036(a)(1) the
decedent must have retained the use ("possession or enjoyment") or the right to the
income of the property for himself; under §2036(a)(2) the decedent must retain only the
right to designate who shall enjoy the benefits of the property. In the instant case, the
Tax Court relied exclusively on subsection (1).
2. 63 T.C. 746 (1975).
3. See, e.g., United States v. Estate of Grace, 395 U.S. 316, 1969-1 U.S.T.C. 12,609
(1969); United States v. O'Malley, 383 U.S. 627, 1966-1 U.S.T.C. 12,388 (1966). Although
§2036 is the only section of the code that includes transfers with a retained life estate
within a decedent's gross estate, it is only one of several sections that tax transfers that
are "essentially testamentary" in nature. For example, §2035 includes transfers executed in
contemplation of death within three years of death; §2037 includes in the gross estate
interests transferred where the transferee can obtain possession or enjoyment only by
surviving decedent and decedent retains a reversionary interest worth 5% of the value of
the property; §2038, which overlaps §2036(a)(2), includes interests transferred subject to
decedents power to alter the enjoyment thereof; §2039 includes in the gross estate annuities
payable to another by reason of surviving decedent; §2040 sometimes includes in the gross
estate property owned in a joint tenancy with a right of survivorship or in a tenancy by the
entirety. None of these sections, however, subjects the lifetime transfer of property to an
estate tax if the transfer did not effect a depletion of the decedents estate; §§2035-38 contain the proviso: "except in a case of a bona-fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth." Thus, if the transfer is for an adequate and full
consideration these sections of the Code cannot be employed to include the value of the
property within the decedent's gross estate.
4. Section 2036(a)(1) is the only section of the Code that deals with retained life estates.
Thus, without this section, transfers that leave a life interest in the decedent would not
be included within his gross estate.
5. See, e.g., United States v. Estate of Grace, 395 U.S. 316, 1969-1 U.S.T.C. 12,609 (1969);
United States v. O'Malley, 383 U.S. 627, 1966-1 U.S.T.C.
12,388 (1966). The transfer of
the property must be such that "the ultimate possession or enjoyment . . . is held in
suspense until the moment, of decedent's death or thereafter." Goldstone v. United States,
325 U.S. 687, 691, 1945-2 U.S.T.C. 110,209 (1945). Accord, Commissioner v. Estate of Church,
335 U.S. 632, 646, 1949-1 U.S.T.C. 110,702 (1949).
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[A]n estate tax cannot be avoided by any trust transfer except by a
bona fide transfer in which the settlor, absolutely, unequivocally, irrevocably, and without possible reservation parts with all of his title
and all of his possession and all of his enjoyment of the transferred
property. After such a transfer has been made, the settlor must be left
with no present legal title in the property, no possible reversionary interest in that title, and no right to possess or to enjoy the property then
or thereafter.6
To avoid the consequences of section 2036, a transferor clearly must convey
not only legal title, but also any right to possess or enjoy the property.
The present section 2036 began its evolution as part of the Revenue Act of
1916, which first imposed the current federal estate tax. According to Section 202(b) of that Act, the value of all transfers "intended to take effect in
possession or enjoyment at or after his death" would be included in the decedent's gross estate.7 The committee reports in both the House of Representatives" and the Senate9 shed little light on the legislative intent embodied
in this section. The need for increased revenues to deal with the world crisis
in 1916 appears to have been the primary concern of the Congress. 10 The
court decisions that interpreted section 202(b), however, did not expand its
scope beyond what seemed to be the plain meaning of the words." Thus,
from 1916 until the close of the Twenties, only property transferred in fee
with a retained life estate and the value of an inter vivos trust from which a
settlor received income for life were included in the decedent's gross estate
2
under the "possession or enjoyment" clause of section 202(b).1
- In 1930, however, a Supreme Court decision, May v. Heiner,'3 altered the
previous judicial interpretation of section 202(b) and prompted the legislative
changes from which the present statute, section 2036, has evolved. In May, decedent had created a trust with a life interest in her husband, followed by a
life interest for herself, and then the corpus over on the death of both. The
6.

335 U.S. 632, 645, 49-1 U.S.T.C.

10,702 (1949). This case dealt with the construc-

tion of §811(c) of the Int. Rev. Code of 1939. Section 811(c) is the statutory predecessor of
current §§2036 and 2037. This explains Justice Black's reference to "possible reversionary
interest," which would now be covered by §2037 and not §2036; however, the quote is
otherwise valid as a formulation of the type of transfer necessary to escape taxation under
§2036.

7. Revenue Act of 1916, §202(b).
8. H.R. REP. No. 922, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1916).
9. S. REp. No. 793, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1916).
10. "As stated in the House report, the necessity for this legislation grows out of the
extraordinary increase in the appropriations to defray the cost of preparedness as represented in the additional appropriations for the Army, Navy, fortifications, Military Academy,
and deficiencies caused by the military situation." Id.
11.

See, e.g., Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U.S. 531, 1 U.S.T.C.

239

(1929);

Shukert v.

Allen, 273 U.S. 545, 1 U.S.T.C. 223 (1927). Under §202(b) a transfer would be taxed only
if an interest in the property passed from the decedent to others at or after his death; the
transfer had to be a "transfer at death." Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U.S. 339,
348, 1 U.S.T.C. 347 (1930).
12. For an example of the inclusion of life trusts under §202(b), see McCaugh v. Girard
Trust Co., 11 F.2d 520 (3d Cir. 1926).
13. 281 U.S. 238 (1930).
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Supreme Court held that the value of the trust was not includible in the
decedent's gross estate.14 In reaching that conclusion, the Court reasoned
that the transfer of the remainder interests took place at the execution of
the agreement rather than at death and that the decedent retained no interest
that passed to another at death. 15
After three per curiam decisions the following year dispelled any notion
that May rested on the presence of an intervening life estate, 16 Congress took
immediate action to amend the statute and cover the deficiencies left by
May.17 The congressional debate made clear that May had removed from section 202(b) precisely the type of transfer that the section had been intended
to encompass.18 The joint Resolution of March 3, 1931,19 which effected the
necessary changes, was clarified and embodied in section 803 of the Revenue
Act of 1932.20 By enacting these revisions, Congress apparently intended only
to overrule the Supreme Court and to tax those situations presented in
May and the three per curiam decisions. 21 The urgency of congressional action was necessitated by the possible loss of revenue if life trusts were not
within the reach of the federal estate tax. 2 2 There is nothing contained in

either the floor discussion on the joint resolution 23 or in the committee report
on the Act of 193224 to indicate that Congress intended to do more than
merely include in a decedent's gross estate a trust giving the decedent income
for life or the right to designate who should enjoy that income. Since the

14. Id.
15. Id. at 244-45. See R. STEPHENS, G. MAxEID & S. LIND, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIrT
TAXATION 103 (3d Ed. 1974).
16. Burnet v. Northern Trust Co., 283 U.S. 782 (1931); Morsman v. Burnet, 283 U.S.
783 (1931); McCormick v. Burnet, 283 U.S. 784 (1931).
17. The day after the per curiam decisions Congress passed the Joint Resolution of
March 3, 1931. See note 19 infra.
18. 74 CONG. REG. 7078 (1931). See note 21 infra.
19. The Joint Resolution included in the gross estate: "a transfer under which the
transferor has retained for his life or any period not ending before his death (1) the
possession or enjoyment of, or the income from, the property or (2) the right to designate
the persons who shall possess or enjoy the property or the income therefrom." H.R.J.
Res. 529, 71st Cong., 3d Sess. ch. 454 (1931).
20. Revenue Act of 1932, §802.
21. Mr. Smoot: "It had generally been considered that this provision of the statute
[§202(b)] covered cases such as those referred to above [life trusts]. The Treasury Department had so construed the statute since the first Federal estate tax law in 1916 and its
regulations so provided. ... Under the decisions rendered yesterday [the three per curiam
decisions], the property would not be included in computing the Federal estate tax ...
It is entirely apparent that if this situation is permitted to continue, the Federal estate
tax will be seriously affected. . . . It is of the greatest importance, therefore, that this
situation be corrected and that this obvious opportunity for tax avoidance be removed. It
is for that purpose that the joint resolution is proposed." 74 CONG. REe. 7078 (1931).
22. 74 CONG. REc. 7198, 7199 (1931) (letter of Acting Secretary of the Treasury Ogden
Mills explaining that the possible loss of revenue would be $25 million).
23. See note 21 supra.
24. H.R. REP. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 47 (1932); S. REP. No. 655, 72d Cong., Ist
Sess. 49 (1932).
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passage of the Act of 1932, there have been no substantial changes in what
is currently section 2036.25

Despite the apparent intention of Congress to include only historical life
estates and life trusts within the scope of section 2036, courts have acquiesced
in an administrative expansion of the statute's applicability to innumerable
factual circumstances.26 The approach the courts have adopted in interpreting
section 2036 has led to uncertainty and unpredictability in estate planning. -° i
By considering the substance rather than the form of property transfers 28 in
a case by case manner, the courts have fostered the instability that surrounds
Section 2036.
Although it is possible to interpret section 2036 broadly, and thereby include many types of property transfers, the unpredictability of the courts' attempt to fashion the meaning of this section, case by case, has been an unfortunate consequence. Recently, however, the Supreme Court, in United
States v. ByruM, 29 apparently attempted a stabilization of section 2036. In

Byrum the decedent had transferred voting stock of three close corporations
to an irrevocable trust. Byrum retained, along with several other managerial
powers, the right to vote the corporate stock.3 0 In a decision grounded on a
literal construction of section 2036, the Supreme Court held that the decedent had not retained the requisite "enjoyment of" or a sufficient "right to
designate who shall enjoy" the property.31 The Court concluded, therefore,
that the value of the stock was not within the reach of either section
2036(a)(1) or (2).32
The literal analysis employed by the Byrum Court did not delve into the
substance of the transfer but, rather, ignored the realistic impact of Byrum's
25. Since 1932 the amendments have occurred as follows: Technical Changes Act of
1949, §§7-8; Technical Changes Act of 1953, §207; INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §2036.
26. E.g., United States v. Estate of Grace, 395 U.S. 316, 23 A.F.T.R.2d 69-1954 (1969)
(reciprocal life interest trusts created by husband and wife in each other's favor, which
left both in the same economic position as if each had created his own trust, were includible in gross estate under §2036); Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Smith, 356 U.S. 274,
1 A.F.T.R.2d 58-2151 (1958) (annuity-life insurance arrangement separated by the Court;
annuity from which decedent received income for life held taxable, the life insurance
policies held non-taxable); United States v. Past, 347 F.2d 7, 15 A.F.T.R.2d 65-1422 (9th
Cir. 1965) (transfer to trust by husband and wife as part of property settlement incident
to divorce not for an adequate and full consideration held taxable under §2036).
27. For a review of the cases and the inconsistencies present in this area, see Comment,
Taxation - Federal Estate Tax - The Construction of Section 2036, 60 MIcH. L. REV. 631
(1960).
28. The substance over form test is one traditionally employed by the courts in tax
cases. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Estate of Church, 355 U.S. 632, 1949-1 U.S.T.C. 10,702
(1949). But cf. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Smith, 356 U.S. 274, 1 A.F.T.R.2d 58-2151
(1958).
29. 408 U.S. 125, 30 A.F.T.R.2d 72-5811 (1972).
30. Decedent in Byrum retained the power to remove the designated trustee, appoint
a successor trustee, and veto the sale or investment of the corpus. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. In Byrum the Court dealt with both §2036(a)(1) and (2); in the instant case the
Tax Court only considered the applicability of §2036(a)(1). The significance of Byrum
relative to the instant case, however, is in the literal interpretation employed by the
Byrum Court in construing §2036.
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actual control. The strict construction used by the Supreme Court, if followed
by the lower courts, has the potential for providing the estate planner with a
concrete, ascertainable, judicial interpretation of an area of the law that demands stability.
In the instant case, however, the Tax Court engaged in a broad reading
of section 2036. 3 The court framed the issue in terms of whether decedent
had actually "retained" a significant interest in, or control over, the property
transferred during his lifetime.34 The Commissioner contended that since decedent had continuously occupied the property from some time prior to the
transfer until the time of his death, he literally "retained the possession or
enjoyment" of the land for a period "which did not in fact end before his
death." ' In addition, the Comissioner argued that the low rental charge
was indicative of a lack of substance surrounding the whole transaction. 36 The
estate countered with the argument that the decedent had sold the realty for
a full and adequate consideration, and then had transferred that consideration, the stock, without retaining any interest in it. According to the estate's
arguments the only interest that decedent held was a purchased interest by
virtue of the lease, not the kind of retained interest contemplated by section
37
2036 (a)(1).
Applying the traditional substance over form test, 38 the court accepted
the Commissioner's contentions and concluded that the value of the transferred property fell within the reach of section 2036(a)(1).3 9 In examining
whether decedent's acts constituted a transfer that would escape taxation under
this section, the Tax Court relied on Justice Black's "unconditional transfer"
formulation in Estate of Church.40 The significant facts, according to the
instant court, were the low rental payment coupled with the option provisions
of the lease. 41 These two facts, taken together, were "irreconcilable" with
the bona fide, unqualified transfer required to escape taxation under section
2036.42 The court was "convinced" that the entire transaction, commencing
with the creation of the corporation and ending with the transfer of the stock
into trust, was but a "single device" by which decedent attempted to rid
himself of the burden of estate tax without relinquishing the possession and
enjoyment of the property. 43
This "substance over form" approach can certainly be justified in light
of the previous 40 years of judicial interpretation.4 4 Moreover, in reaching its
decision, the Tax Court was merely adhering to the accepted case by case
reasoning. But, by looking through the form of decedent's transfer and viewing
33. 63 T.C. 746 (1975).

34. Id. at 761.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 762.
Id.
Id. See text accompanying notes 45-51 infra.
63 T.C. at 764. See note 28 supra.
Id. at 765.
335 U.S. 632, 645, 1949-1 U.S.T.C. 10,702 (1949). See text accompanying note 6 supra.
63 T.C. at 764-65.
Id. at 763.
Id. at 764
See generally, Comment, supra note 27.
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only its operative effect, the instant court expanded section 2036 to include a
conveyance that appears not to be literally covered by the statute.
The wording of section 2036(a) excludes all transfers that constitute a
"bona-fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's
worth." 45 Since decedent conveyed his land in exchange for 100 percent of
the stock of a corporation set up exclusively to hold the property, the sale
was certainly for an "adequate and full consideration." Decedent remained
on the land only by virtue of a lease agreement executed subsequent to the
property transfer. Furthermore, the stock that decedent received was placed
in an irrevocable trust in which he retained no rights whatsoever.46 If a
strict, narrow construction of the statute had been employed by the instant
court, as it was in Byrum, the result reached could have been markedly
different.
The Tax Court, however, chose to "disregard" the transfer and lease agreements between decedent and Hall, Inc.4 7 These transactions, which the instant court found "wholly lacking in bona fides, ' ' 4 were not allowed to obscure the substance of what was before the court. 49 If "substance is the touchstone of taxability," 50 then the decision in the instant case is sound. By his
elaborate plan, decedent apparently did attempt to avoid the estate tax
and still retain the possession and enjoyment of his property.
The significance of the instant case, however, rests in the broad interpretation that the Tax Court. attached to section 2036. If the court can "disregard" a transfer for an "adequate and full consideration" by merely declaring
that the transactions were not "bona fide," then the estate planner cannot
predict with any accuracy what situations will or will not be covered by section 2036. Intrafamily transactions such as characteristically give rise to estate
tax problems do not lend themselves very well to marketplace tests. The
literal approach of Byrurn has offered some promise of certainty, but if the
courts continue to apply this section in a broad fashion, Congress should
take the initiative and enact a more specific statute. As the Court noted in
Byrum, "when a principle of taxation requires re-examination, Congress is
better equipped than a court to define precisely the type of conduct which
results in tax consequences." 51
52
In the past 45 years, Congress has amended section 2036 several times.
None of these revisions, however, has provided the stability that estate planning
45. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §2036(a). See note 1 supra.
46. Since the decedent retained no rights in the trust, his argument appears much
stronger than the decedent in Byrum, who retained broad managerial powers. On the
other hand, it certainly must be recognized that, when the decedent made this lease
agreement with the corporation prior to the transfer of the stock to the trust he was really
only dealing with himself, because, in contrast to the facts of Byrum, decedent was then
the sole shareholder of the corporation.
47. 63 T.C. at 766.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 765.
50. Estate of McNichol v. Commissioner, 265 F.2d 667, 669, 1959-1 U.S.T.C. §11,868
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 329 (1959).
51. 408 U.S. at 135.
52. See note 25 supra.
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